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ABSTRACT 
The paper aims to address the question whether the dynamic of autoworker 
unionism in South Korea and Malaysia was conditioned by, and eventually also 
influenced the globalization processes in the local auto industry? The 
conclusion is a contextualized "yes", and the core argument is the following: 
 The financial crisis in 1997 was the dramatic peak of financial 
globalization in East Asia in the 1990s, and it did accelerate the existing trend in 
Korea towards centralized unionism in the auto industry, while it suspended the 
trend in the Malaysian auto industry towards decentralized unionism. Although 
the Korean and Malaysian unions were affected by the financial crisis from 
different structural and strategic positions, and were exposed to different 
national policies and corporate strategies of crisis management, the Korean 
unions and Malaysian unions generally followed, respectively, a more radical 
and militant and a more pragmatic and moderate strategy. In the global-local 
perspective we face two paradoxes.  
The first paradox is that in spite of the difference in union ideology, the 
outcome in terms of industrial relations (IR) institutions was rather similar in the 
sense that the auto industry contained a mixture of industrial and enterprise 
unions and formal or informal federations of these unions, and that collective 
bargaining was by and large undertaken bilaterally at the enterprise level. This 
situation was generated by a dynamic, which took the Malaysian system down 
from a centralized IR system within the low technology assembly industry (the 
globally subordinated local OEMs) to a rather decentralized IR system within 
the SOE-MNC controlled industry. The Korean system became more 
centralized through the confrontations between radical enterprise unions and 
authoritarian employers and authorities within an auto industry, which over time 
become much more indigenized, technologically advanced, export-oriented and 
diversified into multiple auto manufacturers and an under-wood of component 
suppliers. Yet, in both auto industries the large enterprise unions resisted 
organizational centralization, which could impede their autonomy. Due to the 
strength of unions of the market leading firms a breakthrough did happen 
neither in Korea nor in Malaysia, although the Koreans were a step ahead of the 
Malaysians having established a federation of metalworkers unions, including 
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the important autoworkers unions.  
The second paradox is that the radicalism of the Korean autoworker 
unions was maintained during 1990s globalization of the auto industry, while 
radicalism was abandoned by the Malaysian autoworker unions in favor of 
union pragmatism, when the indigenization of the Malaysian auto industry 
unfolded since the early 1980s and a local auto supplier industry had been 
formed. This cross-country difference is partly explained by the different position 
held by the Korean and Malaysian auto companies in the global and local auto 
value chain. The radicalism and effectiveness of Korean autoworker unions 
sustained the development of dynamic efficiency among Korean auto 
manufacturing firms. In the same way, the intra-industry differences in wages 
and working conditions among auto manufacturing firms and components 
supplier firms were also related to the stratification of the domestic auto value 
chain, and this uneven distribution of benefits created obstacles of centralized 
unionization and collective bargaining. The centralized IR system in Malaysia 
evolved in an auto industry composed primarily of firms assembling imported 
CKD kits of components. The inequality of employment conditions between auto 
manufacturers and component suppliers was a driver of the strategy of 
centralized unionism and collective bargaining in Korea, while the inequality 
was not perceived as that significant by the Malaysian industrial union, since 
they had been dealing with these problems by the early 1990s.  
 
Keywords: Globalisation, trade unions, automobile industry, global value chain  
theory, East Asia, Malaysia, South Korea. 
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List of abbreviations 
AFTA: Asean Free Trade Area 
CB: Collective bargaining. 
CA: Collective agreement 
CBU: Completely build up (automobile). 
CKD: Completely knocked down (set of automobile components). 
DMC: Daewoo Motors. 
EU: Enterprise union. 
FDI: Foreign direct investment. 
FKTU: Federation of Korean Trade Unions  
GCC: Global Commodity Chain. 
GERPISA: Permanent group for the study of the automobile industry and its employees. 
GM: General Motors 
GVC: Global Value Chain. 
HMC: Hyundai Motor Co. 
IMVP: International Motor Vehicle Program. 
IR: Industrial relations, i.e. relations between employers’ associations, employees’ union and 
state agencies. 
IU: Industrial union. 
JIT: Just in time. 
JV: Joint venture 
KMC: Kia Motors. 
IMFmetal: International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF, yet her called IMFmetal to distinguish it 
from the International Financial Fund, IMF).  
IR: Industrial relations (between trade unions and employers/associations and the authorites) 
ISA: Internal Security Act, Malaysia 
KCTU: Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
KMWF: Korean Metal Workers Federation. 
KMWU: Korean Metal Workers Union. 
LDC: Less Developed Country (a developing country) 
LV: Light vehicle 
MMC: Mitsubishi Motor Co. 
MNC: Multinational corporation 
MTUC: Malaysian Trades Union Congress 
NGO: Non-governmental organization. 
NUTEAIW: National Union of Transport Equipment and Allied Industries Workers (before 1990 
called TEAIEU: Transport Equipment and Allied Industries Employees Union). 
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturing. 
ODM: Original Design Manufacturing. 
OBM: Original Brand Manufacturing. 
OES: Original Equipment Supplier. 
ODS: Original Design Supplier. 
OBS: Original Brand Supplier. 
SOE: State-owned enterprise 
TRIM: Trade-Related Investment Measures 
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“Trade union experience is national, but the challenge is global!”  
Peter Unterweger, International Metalworkers’ Federation, Bangkok 2002. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the literature on economic globalization and restructuring in East Asia, few 
studies address the reactions and impacts of trade unions on these changes. 
The article aims to analyze how trade unions in the Korean and Malaysian 
automobile industries (auto industries hereafter) respond to industrial changes 
and organize and act collectively in order to influence employment conditions, 
industrial relations, corporate restructuring and broader social transformations 
before, during and after the East Asian financial crisis 1997-99. 
While entering the crisis from different structural and strategic positions 
and being exposed to different national policies and corporate strategies of 
crisis management the Korean auto unions overall adopted a more radical and 
militant strategy while the Malaysian counterpart employed a more pragmatic 
and moderate strategy. This chapter argues that this difference was mainly due 
to the fact that opportunities for increasing real benefits through unionization 
and industrial action were completely different between the Korean and 
Malaysian auto industries. Above all, they were located in very different 
positions in the global value chain: Korean auto companies were much more 
internationalized and had already reached higher global value chain positions 
than their Malaysian counterpart. Moreover, the Korean unions enjoyed more 
political space than Malaysian unions due to the consolidation of political 
democracy in Korea since the beginning of democratization in 1987. However, 
this article also argues that both types of union strategy made sense in their 
particular institutional and historical context, and they eventually contributed to 
changing the industrial relations of the industry and probably also sustaining or 
improving nominal wages and working conditions, yet without affecting the 
corporate structure of the industry. 
The article relies on primary empirical studies done in 1999 on national 
auto industries in Korea and Malaysia with Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) and 
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Daewoo Motor (DMC) in Korea and Proton and Perodua in Malaysia, and in 
2001-2003 on auto workers’ trade unions and federations in both countries, 
including Korean Metal Workers Federation (KMWF), Korean Metal Workers 
Union (KMWU), and the Malaysian National Union of Transport Equipment and 
Allied Industry Workers (NUTEAIW), which all organized employees in the auto 
industry and beyond. 
The article is structured as follows: In section 2, we develop a theoretical 
framework to explain the processes of globalization in the auto industry and put 
trade unions as part of a globalizing production system. The global and local 
dimensions of the Korean and Malaysian auto industries are outlined in section 
3. Then, the industrial relations of the auto industry in Korea and Malaysia 
before, under and after the East Asian Financial Crisis are described in section 
4. In section 5, the dynamics of the trade unionism in the Korean and Malaysian 
auto industries are explained by investigating its interface with the political 
economic aspects of globalization and the interaction between labor and capital 
in the auto industry in a broader context of labor organization and mobilization. 
Section 6 winds up the argument. 
Global automobile production, state policy and trade unionism: a 
theoretical framework 
The auto industry has been recognized as the ‘industry of industries’ (Dicken 
2003, p. 355). When this notion became outdated and obsolete in the industrial 
North in the 1970s due among other things to increasing internationalization 
and ‘maturity’ of auto markets it gained new popularity in developing countries, 
not least in Korea in the 1970s and in Malaysia in the 1980s. When industrial 
internationalization during the 1990s turned into regionalization with free trade 
regions like the EU, NAFTA, and AFTA on the one hand and MNC-driven global 
production networks on the other hand, global auto production stagnated with 
an over-capacity of 50% to be followed by a brutal worldwide consolidation 
among MNCs with plant closures, acquisitions, rationalization, relocation, 
outsourcing etc. Due to the combination of globalization and ‘economic 
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nationalism’ some developing countries like Korea and Malaysia pursued a 
continued expansion of their domestic auto manufacturing capacity (Wad 2001). 
Recently, this counter-trend in developing countries has even accelerated with 
MNCs rallying for the expanding auto markets in India and mainland China. 
Gerry Gereffi (1999) and others (Humphrey & Memedovic 2003) have 
argued that the internationalization process of various industries should be 
understood as a global commodity chain (GCC) driven by lead firms. In the 
case of the automobile industry, Gereffi found a producer-driven global 
commodity chain. Such a chain is characterized by an inter-firm, corporate 
power structure, in which the lead chain firms are the final original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs). More specifically, MNCs with own brand manufacturing 
of automobiles are the lead chain firms at the global level, while foreign 
subsidiaries, associate companies or licensed domestic firms may be lead firms 
at the national level2. The global auto chain is producer-driven in the sense that 
the chain is controlled by the global OEMs governing the activities of the 
components supplier companies as well as distributors and dealers. As such, 
the global auto chain differs both from a classic market situation, which may 
only be found in the aftermarket for non-original component equipment and 
second-hand automobiles, and from global buyer-driven chains to be found, for 
example in the global garment industry, where big retailers govern the global 
chain due to their control over design and marketing. 
The global commodity chain is also a global value chain, which is stratified in 
accordance with the distribution of value adding activities and yields throughout 
the various links and controlled (governed) by the lead chain firms. R&D, 
design, marketing, branding and financing may all be functions, which add more 
value compared to, for example, component manufacturing and auto vehicle 
assembling. The globalization of the auto industry has generated a global 
structure whereby various chain leaders (OEMs) have established a certain 
hierarchy of component suppliers delivering whole systems or modules (½ tiers 
suppliers), advanced components eventually involving design collaboration with 
the OEM (1st tier suppliers), more simple components of international standard 
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(2nd tier suppliers), simple components of local standards (3rd tier suppliers) etc. 
With the principle of “build-where-you-sell” and regional market integration, 
chain leaders will ask their key suppliers (½ tier or 1st tier suppliers) to follow 
them into new markets through FDI (“follow sourcing”) where they again may 
impact on local auto firms by way of undercutting, acquiring or forming joint 
venture. Evidence indicates that linkages between foreign OEMs and local auto 
suppliers may upgrade local firms’ capabilities in terms of productivity and 
product variety, but seldom in terms of product design and R&D. Hence, local 
firms face problems of vertical mobility within the OEM supplier hierarchy from 
lower tier status to 1st tier and ½ tier status and by implication to higher value 
adding activities (Wad 2004b). 
Within the particular segments we do also find so-called market leaders, 
which are the dominant producers of automobiles in a particular market 
segment. In Korea HMC has been the market leader, and in Malaysia Proton 
rapidly rose to a dominant market position in the mid-size segment. Worldwide, 
GM was for long a market leader in non-luxury car segments, while Mercedes-
Benz dominated the luxury car segment. In fact, competition within the global 
and national auto chains takes place as a competition between particular auto 
chains lead by the particular OEM, eventually allied with other transnational ½ 
tier and 1st tier suppliers.  
The labor force employed by the various auto enterprises is locked into this 
global production structure, and this stratified value system influences very 
much the options for employment, income, working environment, training etc. 
Lead chain firms will normally earn more revenue than other firms upstream and 
downstream, and the market leaders will also make more profit than market 
followers. This difference in value adding spills over into the space for wage 
concessions and overall improvement of working conditions (Sturgeon & Florida 
2000). Finally, trade unions also face very different employers and bargaining 
strategies depending on their position within the global production system, and 
unionizing and uniting the union organizations are also influenced by this global 
production system.  
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Theories of industrial relations (IR) have, in the West, since the 1950s 
applied the IR system approach comprised by the relations between the 
workers and their trade unions, the employers and their associations, and the 
government and state institutions responsible for labor markets and workplace 
issues (Kelly 1998). Over time, the approach has been expanded by way of 
analyzing IR issues at several levels (macro, mezzo and micro) and including 
other stakeholders like civil society groups (non-governmental organizations). In 
Third World IR studies researchers have focused on the state-labor nexus 
because the state was considered paramount to economic development and 
controlled economic activities and labor relations much more than it did in the 
West (Frenkel 1993, Kuruvilla 1996). But with increasing globalization and rapid 
industrialization in many East Asian economies, a new market perspective has 
taken over aiming to explain labor trends at least in Asia by forces of economic 
globalization (Kuruvilla et.al. 2002; Kuruvilla & Erickson 2002). Because private 
sector relations have become more important in East Asian countries, we 
suggest that the IR system approach has become more, not less, relevant in 
analyzing IR in this region. Yet, being a rather closed nation-centered 
perspective, the IR perspective needs to be opened up to deal with and 
incorporate globalization processes and international agents like multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to become appropriate and achieve explanatory power in 
the 21st century, and a multi-level comparative approach is required integrating 
the analysis of structures and actors at the macro, mezzo and micro levels 
(Jeong & Wad 2004).  
Our analysis of IR in Korean and Malaysian auto industries (the mezzo level) 
will focus on the conception (or ideology) of trade unionism among autoworker 
unions, the structure of the trade unions, the collective bargaining institution 
established with their employer counterpart, and the IR strategy pursued by the 
union. Three ideal types of trade union ideology are outlined: Radical unionism, 
pragmatic unionism and conservative unionism where radical unionism is based 
on a conception of labor-management relations as antagonistic and conflict-
ridden, while pragmatic unionism takes them to be dialectical (mutual conflict-
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ridden and cooperative) and conservative unionism understand them as mutual 
beneficial and collaborative. The concept of trade union structure captures the 
employee constituency of the union in terms of sector based union, for example 
the industrial union organizing employees within a specific industry, the 
enterprise union organizing employees within a specific enterprise, or the 
general union organizing employees within all sectors (crafts, occupations, 
industries). In a global economy, we even find world councils, which are bodies 
of trade unions within a MNC, and global unions, which are multilateral 
federations of national trade unions (e.g. the International Metalworkers’ 
Federation).  
Institutions of collective bargaining between unions and employers can 
prescribe interaction to take place at various levels: the micro level (the 
enterprise) and may, for example, create a “company government compromise”, 
which some researchers (e.g. the GERPISA group) take to be decisive for 
corporate viability; the mezo level (the sector, industry); the national level and 
even at the international level, for example where a Corporate Code of Conduct 
(the so-called ‘International Framework Agreements’) is agreed upon by a MNC, 
its world council and the relevant global union (e.g.. the International 
Metalworkers Federation, henceforth IMFmetal). Collective bargaining (CB) and 
-agreements (CAs) may be centralized, with for example, CB taking place at the 
industry level, or decentralized CB evolving at the enterprise level.  
We suggest that there is a certain strategic coherence and practical 
interdependence between radical unionism, general or sector wide organizing 
and -collective bargaining, and that such IR strategies do only evolve under 
certain conditions, because the practicality of these strategies are dependent on 
other IR actors, for example whether employers organize at the same sector 
level as the employees and accept to undertake centralized collective 
bargaining, and whether the state’s labor laws allow for the particular kind of 
organizing and negotiation aimed for by the union strategy. Certain IR trends in 
the OECD area, envisaged since the globalization of the 1980s and 1990s, are 
identified: first, collective bargaining has become more decentralized; second, 
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trade unions have become more centralized (larger or more concentrated) and 
even more differentiated for example with conglomerate unions unionizing 
employees across sectors; and third, the classical Western model of IR-
tripartism, based on negotiations between the government, and the peak 
organizations of labor and capital (social corporatism) at macro and mezo 
levels, is withering into either “lean corporatism” (organized decentralization) or 
neo-liberalism (disorganized decentralization) (Traxler et.al. 2001). Korea has 
been highlighted as a deviant case because centralized unionism and -
collective bargaining and social corporatism have been pursued since the late 
1990s (Jeong 2001b; Kim 2004).  
All types of union ideology may be appropriate in terms of trade union 
effectiveness, due to the structural interdependence of labor and management 
for efficient production, productivity, and competitiveness. The effectiveness of 
militancy, co-operation or subordination respectively depend on whether the IR 
system generate static business efficiency (zero-sum game) by way of resolving 
economic problems through hiring and firing of labor (external flexibility) or 
dynamic business efficiency (win-win outcomes) by means of resolving 
problems through internal relocation and reorganization of the workforce into 
team work, vocational training, multi-skills, investment in new technology etc. 
(functional flexibility) (Standing 1992). Hence, dynamic efficiency may be 
achieved in three ways: a) through a strong, independent and militant union 
confronted with a management aiming to neutralize rising labor costs through 
increased productivity achieved by investment, technological development and 
rationalization of work organization (the so-called Western model of Fordism); 
or b) through a productivity coalition (or company production compromise) 
based on a weaker, dependent and collaborative union (conservative unionism) 
if management pursues a strategy of corporate welfare and micro corporatism 
(the so-called Japanese model); or c) through union-free workshops where a 
human resource development strategy is applied adopting decentralized 
governance and acknowledgement of employees’ innovation capabilities and 
importance for the core competences of the company (human resource 
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management). We assume that unions will reflect on their experiences about 
outcomes of particular organizational structures, forms of leadership, industrial 
actions and other practices, and that they will learn how to develop or transform 
their strategies, organizations and collective practices and change their union 
ideology accordingly. This may even reach a point where the union completely 
transforms its very ideology or union structure or mode of collective bargaining, 
reflecting lessons learned and changing power relationships due to, for 
example, the impact of political, economic and cultural globalization.            
Korean and Malaysian auto industries and firms 
The Asian-Pacific region (excluding Japan) makes up the world’s fourth largest 
area of light vehicles (LV: cars and commercial vans) manufacturing and sales 
(IMFmetal 2003). In 2002 Korea’s auto market registered 1,240,000 LVs and 
was more than three times larger than Malaysia’s with 375,000 LVs (IMFmetal 
2003), but its total production of LVs was nearly 8 times as big due to its 
formidable export production, 3,096,000 versus 395,000 respectively (OICA 
2002). The Korean auto industry labor force amounted to 362,000 employees in 
1998 and 368,000 in 2001, while the Malaysian ditto counted 40,500 employees 
in 2000 and 45,000 employees in 2002 (Korea: Jeong 2003 table 6; Malaysia: 
Wad 2004c, p. 13). The Korean workforce was more than eight times as large 
as the Malaysian. 
The establishment of auto assembling firms in Korea and Malaysia in the 
1960s took place with FDI from or through technological alliances or joint 
ventures (JVs) with Japanese and Western firms. In Korea Daewoo Motor 
(DMC) was formed in co-operation with Toyota from 1965 to 1972, and in a 
50/50 joint venture with General Motors (GM) from 1972 to 1992. The company 
became independent from GM in 1992 purchasing GM’s shares and maintained 
its autonomy till 1999. After it went bankrupt GM acquired a determining share 
in 2002. Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) began in 1967 and allied 
technologically with Ford to assemble Ford completely knocked down (CKD) 
sets of components, then in a joint venture (JV) with Mitsubishi Motor 
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Corporation (MMC) (12 per cent) and finally with DaimlerChrysler (DC)(10 per 
cent) in 2000 when HMC also was spun off from the Huyndai Group with 9 other 
subsidiaries (KARI 2001, p. 97). In between DC had obtained a large equity in 
MMC.  
The Korean state intervened in the mid-1970s and forced the Korean 
auto firms to develop their own product and process technology, and to start 
exporting. HMC was the first to succeed and when it participated in the export 
drive, its ties with Ford broke down, and HMC turned to Mitsubishi. HMC was 
very successful in its export to the USA and later in other parts of the world. It 
experienced failure in FDI when it established a transplant in Canada in 1989 
(Chung 2003, p.190). However, HMC continued its export drive and shifted its 
FDI-strategy to targeting developing countries - it formed JVs with local firms in 
East Asia, and one each in Africa and Latin America. In 1998, HMC began 
production in India with its first wholly owned HMC subsidiary. DMC targeted 
the emerging market economies of Eastern Europe, and selected Asian 
countries (India, China, Vietnam, the Philippines), but none in Latin America. By 
2000, HMC, DMC and Kia Motors (KMC), the third largest auto company, which 
was acquired by HMC in 1998, had an overseas production capacity of 
1,659,000 units, of which DMC took 55 per cent and HMC 30 per cent (Chung 
2003:195). The Korean auto industry produced nearly 3 million vehicles in 2001, 
of which more than half was exported (46 percent to the USA and 28 per cent to 
Western Europe)(KARI 2002). HMC and KMC, an affiliate of HMC, made 51 
and 29 percent of total Korean output respectively in 2001. HMC and KMC took 
49 and 27 percent of total domestic sales, and 53 and 31 percent of total export.  
The financial crisis 1997-99 and the subsequent reform policies of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the new Kim Dae Jung government 
represented a watershed in the Korean auto industry in two ways. First, export 
had surpassed domestic sales for the first time. Second, it paved the way for a 
wave of domestic consolidation among Korean auto manufacturers (HMC took 
control of Kia, DMC of Ssangyong) and a subsequently a wave of FDI and 
foreign acquisitions (Samsung Motor by Renault, and DMC by GM). HMC is 
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currently the undisputed market leader in Korea, outstripping GM-Daewoo by a 
big margin (KARI, various annual reports). The Korean auto components 
suppliers rose and fell with the Korean auto manufacturers. Foreign first-tier 
MNC system suppliers like Visteon, Dephi, Bosch and Valeo took control of 
Korean first-tier auto components suppliers like Halla and Duckyang Industry. In 
sum, processes of outward and inward internationalization of the Korean auto 
industry took place before and after the East Asian financial crisis respectively.  
The Malaysian auto industry began from 1967 onwards with Western 
models being assembled through franchising and licensing arrangements, JVs 
or transplants. Due to a small market and the lavish license policy the 
Malaysian auto industry was fragmented and the market was overburden with 
many brands and models making it difficult to localize component production 
profitably. In the 1970s, Western models were ousted by Japanese models, with 
Nissan and Toyota becoming the market leaders, and with the Japanese 
forming joined venture assembly plants with ethnic Chinese-Malaysians. The 
Malaysian government, in pursuing a Malay enhancing policy (the New 
Economic Policy, the NEP), decided to start a national auto project by allying 
with the weakest Japanese link, Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC), and set 
up Proton. Proton targeted the mid-size car market, leaving the luxury market to 
foreign controlled makers for a while, and began exporting without much 
advancement although having sales agents in 50 countries. Proton entered JVs 
in the Philippines (disbanded again), Vietnam (with MMC) and in China to begin 
production in 2005 (Proton 2003). Proton consciously went ahead with 
technology development, acquiring Lotus Group International, a UK design and 
consultancy firm, and allying with another foreign firm to develop an engine. The 
success of the first national car project made the Malaysian government pursue 
a second national car project with Daihatsu, an affiliate of Toyota, to target the 
small-size car market. Perodua, which started production in 1994, saw the 
small-size car market enjoying a boom. This was followed by state-sponsored 
projects for a national motorcycle company and a truck & bus company, with the 
aim of complete dominance of the Malaysian automotive market by national 
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manufacturers. 
The financial crisis 1997-98 changed this planned path of Malaysian auto 
industry. The Malaysian government rescued the national auto companies and 
then proceeded to do the same for the non-national auto companies in 1998. 
The Malaysian auto industry bottomed out in 1998 and recovered as of from 
1999. Proton, being privatized in the mid-1990s, was unable to increase export 
during and after the crisis3 and it was rescued by the national oil company 
(Petronas) and ‘re-nationalized’ in 2002 when the government’s investment 
company (Khazanah Nasional Berhad) increased its share to 33% followed by 
new expansion of capacity (Proton City) and corporate restructuring. However, 
new FDI flowed into the auto industry and a major re-organization of the 
industry happened: Daihatsu obtained 51 percent of Perodua Manufacturing 
Company after the national car maker had been restructured; Honda Motor 
substituted its main local partner for another and established a new JV 
manufacturing facility; HMC established a JV production facility; Toyota Motor 
gained 51 per cent equity control of UMW-Toyota, its domestic JV; Ford 
increased its equity in AMIM from 30 per cent to 49 per cent. In the auto 
supplier industry, foreign auto supplier firms acquired Malaysian firms; for 
example, German Continental AG took a 51 per cent interest in the Sime 
Group's tire division (The Star 2003-10-14). In sum, the Malaysian national auto 
program made huge advances in a protected market in the last two decades, 
but it failed to become a major exporter like the Korean auto industry, or the 
auto industry in neighboring Thailand, relying on MNC subsidiaries.  
By taking a international value chain perspective on the position of 
Korean and Malaysian auto industries and firms we contend that in a global 
value chain perspective the Korean industry takes an overall middle position in 
the global value chain system due to its indigenous brand manufacturing, 
economies of scale and export performance, while the Malaysian industry holds 
a position in the low end due to export failure, weak indigenous brand 
manufacturing and protected home market. The lead manufacturers in their 
respective home markets are HMC and Proton, but Proton’s domestic market 
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share has been declining (Asian Automotive Business Review, July, 2002; 
Proton 2003:34). Moreover, both the Korean and the Malaysian auto industries 
started as internationally subordinated industries, based on MNC equity or 
technology control, but they both underwent a process of indigenization, 
building up national auto firms, before they entered a process of outward 
internationalization through export and FDI. In the East Asian post-crisis period 
since 1997, a new phase of inward internationalization began, driven by local 
reform policies and the ongoing globalization of the auto industry.  
The question is, then, how the structural position and changing relations 
of the Korean and Malaysian auto industries and firms affected the development 
of trade unionism in Korea and Malaysia, and vice versa? In order to answer 
this question, we must first describe how the Korean and Malaysian 
autoworkers unions evolved with the development of the auto industries. 
Trade unionism in Korean and Malaysian auto industries and firms 
The Korean and Malaysian auto unions changed over time in terms of union 
ideology, union structure and collective bargaining, and they turned out to have 
rather different concepts of unionism but relatively similar IR systems at the turn 
of the 21st century! 
 The watershed in Korean trade unionism was the ‘Great Labor Struggle’ 
in 1987, when as new democratic trade unions emerged in the manufacturing 
sector, including the auto industry (Koo 2001). Before 1987, unions were found 
at Kia and DMC from the late 1960s, with the DCM union being company-
controlled until 1985, when the first strike in a chaebol generated a new 
democratic new, while the Kia union and management were collaborating from 
the early 1980s due to a severe financial situation and government pressure 
(Lee 2003, p. 327). The new democratic unions, including the HMC union, went 
on to form wider alliances, networks and federations and a national labor 
center. In 1990 the democratic unions in the Hyundai Group formed the Alliance 
of Trade Unions in Hyundai (ATU Hyundai) inspiring other chaebol unions to do 
the same (Sohn 2002). At the same time, the National Alliance of Trade Unions 
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(NATU) was formed based on 17 regional associations of trade unions, initiated 
in the southern part of Korea and comprising enterprise unions in small- and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs). The General Union Federation of Metal 
Working Industry (GUCMI) and the National Federation of Shipbuilding Trade 
Unions were established in 1994. In 1995, the National Federation of Auto 
Assembly Industry Trade Unions (NFATU) emerged; it included unions in 
assembly companies of Hyundai, Kia, Daewoo, Ssangyong, and Asia Motor. In 
1996, the GUCMI and NFATU established the National Democratic Metal 
Industry Trade Unions (NDMTUA)4. These three federations were all affiliated to 
the democratic labor center, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), 
when it was established 1995. KCTU had a radical, class-oriented program for 
the establishment of a democratic-socialist labor movement, based on industrial 
unions on the one hand and a democratic labor party on the other hand (KCTU 
2000).  
 It took a national general strike from December1996 to January 1997 
against labor reform and the financial crisis during 1997-98 to return labor to the 
center stage of Korean politics (Lee & Lee 2001). These events also created a 
strong momentum to organize an encompassing federation of metal industry 
unions, including the auto manufacturing unions. The various union 
organizations had emerged from the plant level and then associated into two 
different, looser organizations – one for large firms (mainly chaebols) and one 
for SMEs. In order to bridge the gab between different trade union 
organizations, ATU Hyundai proposed to unite the NATU, NFATU and 
NDMTUA in a single Korean Metal Workers Federation (KMWF). This occurred 
in February 1998 at the peak of the financial crisis, when the new government 
formed the Tripartite Commission of government, employers and trade unions 
centers. The KMWF numbered around 200,000 employees and aimed for the 
final consolidation into one industrial union with industry-wide collective 
bargaining authority. The formal centralization of (radical) trade unions in the 
metal industry took place in 2001 with the establishment of the Korean Metal 
Workers Union (KMWU). However, this time the big assembler unions were not 
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driving the unification process, which was carried through by the KMWF 
leadership and SME unions. The big assembler unions stood outside the 
industrial union – even when of all autoworker unions went on strike in solidarity 
with the DMC union as it struggled against the downsizing and imminent take-
over of bankrupt DMC by a foreign auto MNC (KMWF-KCTU, undated). 
 The KMWU initiated regional collective bargaining and supported 
enterprise based bargaining, but the counterpart was missing, i.e. an employers 
association among auto manufacturers and suppliers. In Hyundai, the 
federation of Hyundai unions undertook for the first time common collective 
negotiation with HMC in 2001. In DMC, the union leaders were expelled from 
the factory site during the industrial dispute, and the union leadership was 
handed over to new people who finally accepted that GM acquired DMC after 
facing threats of bankruptcy, a pro-GM alliance of management, administrative 
and technical staff, and weak local community support for an ‘old’ industry and 
plant (see Lee, under review). The sticky point was not only foreign ownership 
but also that GM refused to acquire the Bupyeong factory – the old plant in 
Incheon where the first democratic strike took place in a chaebol and the heavy 
industry in 1985. Samsung Motor was the only auto manufacturer without any 
kind of independent union organization, being isolated from the autoworkers’ 
movement by a vigorous anti-union management.  
 In sum, the Korean auto workers unions and other metal worker unions 
were moving towards a more unified and centralized democratic union structure 
with intentional regional collective bargaining, but the divide between the big 
unions especially in the auto industry and the SME unions in the auto 
component supplier and wider metal industry was difficult to overcome. The 
HMC union has been at the forefront of radical unionism several times, 
organizing, mobilizing and acting militantly, but the HMC union has also been 
divided into several factions, which have different opinions about costs and 
benefits of giving up autonomy transferring it to the KMWU, i.e. to its 
headquarters in Seoul and its regional headquarters in Ulsan. At one end, there 
are the KCTU-convinced activists believing in class solidarity and centralization, 
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at the other end there are the unionists criticizing the leaders of KCTU and 
KMWU for calling strikes all the time for political purposes, without any insight in 
workplace issues or facing their members in daily working life, nor running the 
risks of imprisonment due to illegal industrial action. The critics maintain that the 
top leaders, as former student radicals, take an academic approach to these 
issues. Moreover, it takes a 2/3 majority to give up autonomy, and the result of 
the (last) vote did not cross this threshold although a majority of 62 percent 
voted in favor of joining the KMWU (IMF[metal] IMFNews 2003, No. 3, p.5). 
Meanwhile, the HMC union kept control of union resources and used them to 
fight for the interests of the HMC union members, and quite successfully. At 
HMC the annual wages decreased slightly in 1998 and has increased since 
then with 4.5 percent in 1999, 8 percent in 2000, 12.9 percent in 20015.  
 In Malaysia, autoworkers were organized in an industrial union in 1971. 
The National Union of Transport Equipment and Allied Industries Workers 
(NUTEAIW)6 rapidly turned into a radical union after an internal fight whereby 
grass-root oriented activists from a car assembler of Ford (AMI) took over the 
leadership (Das 1991, p. 129). The new union leadership prompted employers 
to organize an association of assemblers and entering common, centralized 
mode of collective bargaining in 1973. Centralized collective bargaining 
expanded in 1975 but did never include the Nissan assembler (Tan Chong), the 
market leader. Collective bargaining contracted again in 1982 when an 
important employer (UMW-Toyota) withdrew from the employers’ association 
and undertook bilateral negotiation with the industrial union in the same way as 
Tan Chong (Wad 2004a). Hence, a strong centralized IR system prevailed in 
the Malaysian auto assembly industry for a decade and continued to a lesser 
degree for the rest of the 1980s.  
 This system began to be decentralized in three ways (Wad 2004a, pp. 
246-259). First, the non-national auto employers disbanded in the 1990s, and 
the industrial union -- having adopted a more pragmatic ideology -- undertook 
bilateral bargaining with individual employers in the 1990s. Second, enterprise 
unions emerged in the national sector of state owned enterprises (SOEs) or JV-
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enterprises and established negotiation and collective agreements with their 
individual employer. Third, two of the larger assemblers’ workforces broke away 
from the industrial union to form or join enterprise unions in collaboration with 
their employers. The industrial union counter-acted this downsizing of the union 
with a unionization drive in the emerging auto supplier industry, and some 
smaller enterprise unions in auto component supplier firms did even give up and 
joined the NUTEAIW.  
 Under the financial crisis 1997-99, the Malaysian auto industry faced a 
dramatic decline in sales followed by reduction of production and employment in 
1998: Proton’s sales fell 52 percent, Perodua’s 35 percent and non-national 
assemblers saw a 78 percent crop; production fell by 57 percent, 43 percent 
and 85 percent respectively; and employment declined 14 percent, 11 percent 
and 38 percent, respectively (Wad 2004a, p. 243). Although the unions faced a 
sharp downturn in jobs, the rate of redundancies was well below the collapse in 
sales and production. Employment fell 41-47 percentage points less than 
production in the domain of the three organizations!  
 However, the rescue of job did not match the reduction of remuneration. 
Overtime was abolished and working hours were reduced. Collective 
agreements, which were running for at least three years by law, were not 
renewed downwards but extended unchanged for one year or more. While the 
industrial union concluded CAs with 10-15 percent wage increases across the 
board 1994-97 compared to a combined 3-year inflation around 10-12 percent, 
the NUTEAIW managed to get 5-10 percent salary adjustments in CAs 
concluded in 1998-99 compared to a similar level of inflation (NUTEAIW, 1997, 
2000; Jomo & Lee 2001, p. 236). In addition, CAs gave wage increments and 
other benefits, so the standard rates did not decrease in absolute terms during 
the crisis, but the increase was less than inflation increased in the former CA 
period, hence, real hourly wages were declining. The severe damage to take 
home pay was, anyway, caused by the reduction in overtime, which had 
generated a lot extra income in the booming years before the crisis.  
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 Yet, no legal or illegal strikes at the industry and national level were 
ever undertaken in the Malaysian auto industry. During and after the financial 
crisis, only a few wildcat strikes occurred in the unionized sector. Management 
and unions in general collaborated in order to save jobs both in the national and 
the non-national sector. Based on field research on three auto manufacturers 
and two auto suppliers in March 1999, Peetz & Todd (2000, p. 72) reported that 
the auto manufacturers attempted to adjust in a worker-friendly way during the 
crisis while outright retrenchment was carried out among auto component 
suppliers. During the crisis, enterprise unions began networking with one 
another, and a few also met with the industrial union. The NUTEAIW feared that 
the in-house unions should give in and lower the terms of employment during 
the financial crisis. Although the attempt of collective networking faded with 
economic recovery, the industrial union saw the need to form in the future a 
federation of auto unions as the autoworkers faced a free trade area among the 
ASEAN countries (AFTA), which would include automobile trade around 2005. 
The issue was restated in 2002 and set a mandate for the industrial union to be 
the secretariat in charge of the formation of a Federation of autoworkers unions. 
An agreement was reached in 2004 to form a Federation constituted by 
NUTEAIW and the two important enterprise unions in the auto assembling 
industry (Proton and Perodua), but the final decision has to be taken by the 
governing bodies of the unions. 
  In sum, the Malaysian autoworkers began with an industrial union 
(NUTEAIW) and established fairly quickly centralized collective bargaining with 
auto assembly companies in the 1970s. After an economic crisis in the mid-
1980s, state-induced industry restructuring and the rise of enterprise unions in 
new and dominant assembly companies in the 1980s and the early 1990s the 
industrial union shifted to pragmatic unionism, halting union decline by 
organizing the auto supplier industry, recapturing enterprise unions, and 
adopting bilateral collective negotiations with employers. The Malaysian 
autoworkers were divided in a radical-turned-pragmatic industrial union and 
conservative enterprise unions that were concomitant with the state-directed 
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indigenization of the auto assembling industry, and this divide was sustained by 
their alliances with the opposition and the leadership, respectively, in the 
national labor center, the Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC). The 
financial crisis and the emerging free trade area of the ASEAN countries forged 
a new alliance between the Malaysian industrial union and the key enterprise 
unions agreeing in principle, but not yet in practice, on the formation of a 
Federation of Malaysian auto unions.  
 All in all, while the Korean auto unions adopted a common radical 
conception of unionism, the Malaysian auto unions were divided in terms of 
union ideology (union pragmatism versus conservatism), and while Korean auto 
unions began as enterprise unions and Malaysian auto workers formed an 
industrial union from the outset, both Korean and Malaysian unions ended up 
with a pluralistic union structure which is composed of an industrial union, 
enterprise unions and a federation (established or agreed upon) and with 
unions which by and large undertake bilateral collective bargaining with 
individual employers. Yet, the Korean auto workers are an integrated part of a 
metal industry based federation and union, while the Malaysian auto workers 
are part of a more narrow organization of employees within the motor vehicle 
and component manufacturing industry and join hands with other metal industry 
workers unions in the IMF (metal)-Malaysia Council. In actual numbers and 
union density, the KMWU had 126,000 members (2002) within the metal 
industry, of which most were from the auto industry, while Malaysian auto 
workers unions had 21,300 members (2002) (Jeong & Wad 2004; Wad 2004c). 
In terms of union density, the Korean auto workers stayed around 34 percent in 
2001 (124,500 union members relative to a workforce around 368,000, Jeong 
2003, table 6), while the Malaysian auto workers were as high as 47 percent in 
2002 up from 39 percent in 2000 (Wad 2004c, p. 13)! 
Explaining the dynamics of Korean and Malaysian auto unionism 
What explains this divergence in union ideology and partial convergence in 
industrial relations (IR) patterns between Korea and Malaysia at the dawn of the 
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twenty-first century? In order to answer this general question, we need to be 
more specific and ask five questions and relate them to the summary of industry 
development, state policies and key features of trade unionism (see appendix, 
table 1).  
The first question is why the independent Malaysian autoworkers’ union 
arose much earlier than the independent Korean autoworker unions, although 
the Korean auto industry was established, expanded and technologically 
upgraded earlier than the Malaysian counterpart? 
Korea and Malaysia imported automobiles from the West, before both 
states established a protectionist trading regime in the 1960s to facilitate import 
substitution (IS) in the auto industry, at first aiming at achieving higher levels of 
localization of auto production and later on in order to indigenize ownership, 
develop the industry technologically, and capture the domestic market before 
becoming export competitive. The authoritarian Korean government was more 
successful in IS policies than its Malaysian counterpart and quickly turned the 
private Korean auto firms towards indigenous management, technological 
upgrading and export orientation. It secured domestic expansion in the 1970s 
and export competitiveness in the 1980s by way of keeping wages down 
through state corporatism, that is, state-directed tight wage policy, enforcing 
discipline, and suppressing independent labor union activists. The policies were 
successful but generated a contradiction by producing a mass of repressed and 
angry workers in the midst of success of their huge companies. Hence, while 
autoworkers were prevented from forming independent unions for a period, the 
combined suppression by management and state conditioned a situation, where 
labor activists became part of the broader democratization movement. The 
'Great Labor Struggle' of 1987 to 1990 changed the shop floor power and social 
status of labor for the better, and workers in the automobile and other heavy 
industries initiated a radical and militant trade unions movement in opposition to 
the conservative trade unions which had been organized in the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and co-opted and subordinated by the former 
authoritarian-repressive developmental state.  
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In Malaysia, the auto industry was established and dominated by 
Western MNCs during the first decade through wholly owned subsidiaries, JVs 
or franchising and licensing arrangements with local firms. The workforce of the 
non-national auto industry consisted primarily of Indians and Chinese and so 
did the membership and leadership of the autoworker union. In a conjuncture of 
intra-Malaysian tensions (ethnic cleavages), regional conflicts (the Vietnam 
War), a IR-system of sector unions and centralized collective bargaining in key 
export and infrastructure industries, which dated back to colonialism and the 
anti-communist battle in the 1950s, together with an international trend of neo-
Marxism, the newly formed autoworker industrial union was taken over by 
grass-root oriented leaders who challenged the hegemony of the employers and 
also left the pragmatic trade union center (MTUC) in order to build a new radical 
trade union movement together with other radical unions (Wad 1988, Das 
1991). Hence, the Malaysian autoworkers formed a radical trade union very 
quickly after the start of the Malaysian auto industry, and this industry consisted 
of low technology OEM firms assembling imported completely knocked down 
(CKD) kits of components. A component supplier industry did not yet exist. 
This analysis does also explain the second question, why the 
independent Malaysian and Korean autoworker unions adopted a radical line 
from the onset and yet diverged in terms of organizational structure and forms 
of collective bargaining?  The Malaysian autoworker union arose in a "screw-
driver" (assembly) industry with unskilled workers within a labor marked 
organized by industrial unions and in a tense situation of neo-imperialism and 
ethno-political cleavages, and these conditions facilitated the formation of a 
radical and industrial union. Moreover, centralized collective bargaining was 
known in the large plantation industry and in commerce, including companies, 
which traded in automobiles. The management of the auto assemblers were 
more or less familiar with centralized bargaining from abroad (e.g. Australia), so 
it did not take the employers long time to counteract the radical industrial union 
by establishing their own association for motor vehicle assemblers and accept 
collective bargaining and agreements. Finally, the state prohibited wide industry 
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and class-based unionization, stipulating unions to organize in narrow industries 
and not e.g. in one metal industry union.  
In Korea, the situation was different. The Korean government and 
chaebols insisted on Korean management control of auto firms from the very 
beginning. Hence, the Korean autoworkers were up against a despotic, anti-
union management style, or at best were provided with a state co-opted union, 
which by law had to be wide industry based before 1980 while enterprise-based 
since 1980 (Lindström 1993). The Korean workplace was commanded like a 
garrison, and this militaristic managerial ideology suppressed the individual 
freedom of the single worker and made them feel as a second-class citizen. At 
the same time, the autoworkers formed a concentrated, huge workforce of male 
workers in a strategic capital-intensive industry while living in urban areas, and 
this structural location made them potentially strong as a socio-economic and 
political force.  
When the mobilization began, triggered off by police brutality, the flood of 
militant workers overtook every measure of resistance by authorities and 
employers for a period. With the state's retreat from the workplace, employers 
were left with few means of control against a militant and angry working class 
community. Enterprise unions multiplied in chaebol groups and beyond, 
supported by sympathy strikes and civic groups, and they forced employers to 
undertake enterprise-based collective negotiations although the employers were 
very much against giving up their management prerogatives to lead the 
companies in an authoritarian way.  In sum, the radicalism of Korean and 
Malaysian autoworker unions were rooted in different circumstances, while their 
choices of different types of union structures (enterprise union versus industrial 
union) were conditioned by the institutional options and experiences. 
Then, third question is the following: Why did the Malaysian autoworker 
unions during the 1980s turn to a more pragmatic and conservative unionism 
while accepting rather decentralized collective bargaining, when the Malaysian 
auto industry concomitantly underwent de-globalization or indigenization; and 
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why did the Korean autoworker unions on the contrary maintain a radical 
ideology while favoring centralized IR institutions, when their industry was in a 
process of globalization? In theory, it should be vice versa (see section 2)! 
In Malaysia, the government restructured the auto industry into a 
Malaysian owned and Japanese-oriented industry, because the government 
wanted to rectify ethno-economic imbalances, especially between the Malay 
and Chinese populations, and to rectify the lack of localization of auto 
component production controlled by MNCs. A state-MNC alliance for the benefit 
of the Malays, emerged creating an ethno-political framework for the first 
‘national’ auto project in the early 1980s. The Malaysian government aimed 
rather successful for hegemonic control, among other things, by advocating an 
anti-British and anti-Western "Look East" policy, taking Japan and partly Korea 
as developmental models and promoting enterprise unionism in pursuit of 
corporate harmony and increased productivity, and if necessary, enterprise 
level collective bargaining (Wad 1988). Yet, the trend towards a more 
decentralized IR system was already initiated by the Japanese-related auto 
JVs, which were owned by Chinese Malaysian families, and which came to 
dominate the Malaysian auto market by the end of the 1970s. The Nissan OEM 
stayed outside the association of assemblers from the beginning, although it 
was unionized by the industrial union. But when the new JV between Toyota 
and a Chinese Malaysian owned company emerged in the early 1980s and 
decided to leave the employers' association in favor of bilateral negotiations 
with the industrial union, the centralized Malaysian IR-system declined and fell 
apart into enterprise-level bargaining in the 1990s. The strength of the industrial 
union was reduced in labor market terms, when it, in addition to the in-house 
unionized national auto manufacturers, lost membership control of these 
important, non-national assembly firms (Nissan and Toyota) in the early 1990s. 
This happened due to a dispute among union leaders in the wake of the 
imprisonment of the general secretary, together with other critics of the 
government, in 1987 and the decision to elect new union leaders. In this 
situation, the industrial union switched to a more pragmatic strategy, which 
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meant that it returned to the labor center, the MTUC, that it improved co-
operation with employers which respected the autonomy of the union, and that it 
began organizing the auto component firms which had emerged due to the 
indigenization of the auto industry. The union leadership did also believe that 
bilateral negotiations with individual employers provided it with a better 
bargaining position than it had when it faced a united front of auto assemblers.   
 When the Korean state and capital struck back during the economic 
recession in the early 1990s -- motivated by the unstable environment of 
business and rising labor costs -- workers and unions found themselves on the 
defensive, and this continued with the globalization policy of the Kim Yong Sam 
administration, which emphasized outward FDI and made demands for 
increased competitiveness among Korean firms (Wad 2002). The authorities 
continued to suppress illegal industrial action, and to arrest and imprison labor 
activists; employers started collaborating with moderate unionists forming 
micro-coalitions of productivity improvements (company production 
compromises). Radical union activists concluded that a process of centralization 
was necessary if they should sustain and progress with their labor movement. 
This took time and many debates but did eventually produce the KCTU, which 
was born as a radical and illegal labor center in 1995 and finally legalized with 
the Tripartite concord and ‘Grand Compromise’ between the government, 
employers associations and labor centers in 1998 (Wad 2002). Yet, the KCTU 
abandoned this instance of social corporatism immediately when the leadership 
was ousted after accepting the deal (Kim 2004). 
 The 1990s employer offensive disclosed the weaknesses of enterprise 
unionism, and the KCTU unions promoted the alternative model of industrial 
unionism and industry level bargaining. In the situation of globalization and the 
employers’ counter-offensive in the 1990s, they believed that thousands of 
enterprise unions, which sprung up in the late 1980s, had to consolidate and 
centralize into an industrial union if the trade union movement were to progress. 
Hence, the ongoing confrontations between radical enterprise unions and 
employers, facing increasing competition at the domestic and export markets on 
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the one hand, and rising labor and other production costs in Korea on the other 
hand, sustained the radicalism of the independent and democratic Korean 
unions, including the unions in the heavy metal industries. However, the 
process did not facilitate the establishment of centralized collective bargaining, 
because the Korean employers did not want centralized employer associations 
with bargaining authority. 
This argumentation takes us to the fourth question: Why did the 
autoworker unions in Korea and Malaysia ended up with a rather similar union 
structure at the industry level in spite of their differences in union strategy and 
the different level of internationalization and technological development in the 
two auto industries? The industrial development of the auto industry in Korea 
and Malaysia had created a rather similar structure of larger auto manufacturing 
firms and smaller auto component supplier companies on the one hand, and 
concomitantly positioned the Korean and Malaysian auto firm differently in the 
global auto value chain. The stratification of the domestic auto industry in quite 
different firms with different levels of productivity, profitability and wages created 
different interest groups among the autoworkers, which were again maintained 
by enterprise-based unions. In spite of the radical ideology of the autoworkers 
and their leaders, factionalism evolved in the larger assembly firms, and some 
groups were not eager to completely give up union autonomy and join the 
industrial union. The metal industrial federation was lead by former student-
turned-worker leaders, whom some worker groups judged to be without enough 
workplace experience and insight to understand and support the workplace 
struggle for better wages and working conditions. Hence, the drivers behind the 
development of the industrial union were found in the leadership of the 
federation (KMWF) and among the unions in the smaller supplier firms where 
wages and working conditions were well below the conditions in the chaebols. A 
rather similar situation arose in Malaysia, but from a different starting point: The 
autoworker industrial unions began in the assembly industry, and with the 
national auto program it was pushed away from the dominant assemblers and 
into the components supplier industry where it created a new union stronghold. 
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Korean and Malaysian auto industrial unions differed in a strategic 
sense. While the Malaysian industrial union once did bargain with an employer 
association, the union did not take industry level bargaining to be of strategic 
importance. On the contrary, it perceives bilateral negotiation as an advantage, 
and the union leadership is confident that time will prove that the industrial 
union is stronger than enterprise unions. This relative strength, the union 
contends, is confirmed by the fact that the industrial union has been determining 
the trend in collective bargaining and agreements, and that some in-house 
unions have joined the industrial union in the 1990s. But bilateral negotiations 
between an industrial union and an individual employer emphasizes the 
enterprise level, and the industrial union risks that the management makes use 
of eventual opportunities to support a breakaway faction, which wants to 
establish an in-house union. Such a situation appeared in the past, and it 
emerged again in one of the biggest Malaysian auto component supplier firms 
in 2004.   
The Korean industrial union's strategy towards centralized collective 
bargaining seems to be founded in a commitment to equalize the very unequal 
terms of employment among assembly and supplier firms. But as long as 
employers' are not forced to unite and become convinced that the benefits 
overtake the costs of centralized bargaining, the KMWU does not have a 
reliable counterpart for such industry-level or region-level negotiations. Militant 
actions by the Korean autoworker unions may in the end produce such a unity, 
but with increasing foreign FDI and MNC involvement in Korea's auto industry, 
the ownership structure gets closer to the Malaysian one, and the prospect for a 
centralized association of auto industry employers is bleak. Foreign auto MNCs 
do not seem to join hands with local employers, and with the new adherence to 
human resource management strategies, flexible and decentralized IR are 
paramount for management, and the employers’ IR perspective is completely 
different from the situation in the 1970s, when the production model of Fordism 
prevailed emphasizing economies of scale and standardization in products and 
processes and factor costs. 
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Finally, it is interesting to notice that the establishment of a federation of 
autoworker unions in Korea and Malaysia seem to target different objectives. In 
Korea, the objective was to use the federation as a mechanism to create an 
industrial union and increase the pressure on employers to enter centralized 
bargaining (KCTU 2000). In Malaysia, the objective has been political first and 
foremost, that is to speak with one voice in front of the Malaysian government. 
This was obvious during the East Asian financial crisis, but it has also become 
important in times of transition from a protected automobile home market to a 
regional (AFTA) market, which is protected against import but also contains a 
strong MNC controlled auto industry in Thailand. These differences reflect that 
the key drivers of the auto industry in Korea and Malaysia are not similar. In 
Korea, the national and foreign auto firms are now the core forces of business 
development, which generates and distributes labor benefits among other 
things, while in Malaysia, the state is still seen as the protector of the national 
economy and auto industry. The Malaysian conception of the state as a 
‘protector’ was corroborated during the financial crisis when the government 
instigated currency- and capital control policies, in combination with demand 
expansion, to save the economy in general and the auto industry in particular 
from collapse. And although the ASEAN countries have agreed upon a free 
trade agreement (AFTA), the implementation is still up for political negotiations, 
and will continue to be that for several years to come.  
The fifth question concerns the future: Will the Korean and Malaysian 
autoworkers IR diverge more profoundly in the future, with the Korean IR 
turning in a radical industrial union and a centralized bargaining system, while 
the Malaysian IR evolve into conservative unions dominated by enterprise 
unions and a decentralized bargaining system?  
The answer must take stock of the "union effect" -- the achievements of 
the unions in the past -- and lessons to be learned from these experiences. Two 
aspects will suffice to illustrate this issue.  First, the Korean ‘Great Labor 
Struggle’ in 1987 caused sustained increase in wages and had potential to 
undermine export competitiveness of Korean auto industries. This prospect 
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forced Korean firms to rationalize their organization and invest in technology, 
quality and training. Hence, the militancy of the new independent and 
democratic unions generated dynamic efficiency in the Korean auto industry. 
However, the efficiency was mainly achieved by way of exploiting economies of 
scale through standardized, mass production (Fordism)(Jeong 2001a). The 
wages did also increase in the Malaysian auto industry, but economies of scale 
were only achievable in the national sector in the 1990s. Around the financial 
crisis, Korean auto workers earned a net hourly wage (US$) of 6.67 in 1997, 
which increased to 7.12 US$ in 2001 and 9.40 US$ in 2003/04, while their 
Malaysian counterparts earned 1.81 US$ in 1997, which fell to 0,94 US$ in 
2001 (IMFmetal 1998, 2002, 2004; no data on Malaysia 2003/04). In short, the 
Korean autoworkers earned 3.7 times as much as the Malaysian autoworkers in 
1997 and this difference widened to 7.5 times in 2001.  
Second, the HMC union's battle for the 40-hour, five-day work week in 
2003 ended with a victory of the union, thus, setting a benchmark for other 
unions. In August 2003, HMC concluded a collective agreement with the HMC 
union, which provided the employees with a 40-hour, five-day work week, an 
8.6 percent wage increase for the next year, a performance-based incentive 
worth two months' wages, an immediate incentive worth one-month's wages, 
job security, and a labor-management panel to handle the concerns of 
employees. The collective agreement was approved by 81 percent of the 
members, the highest majority in the history of the HMC Union7. Moreover, it is 
the first time in Korea that a 40-hour, five-day workweek was been agreed 
upon, and it came after a 47-day, on-again, off-again strike by the HMC union8. 
In Malaysia, the claim for a 40-hour workweek has not been on the agenda in 
the auto industry since the 1970s. The best hourly working conditions are a 
42½-hour workweek, practiced in a few auto assemblers in both the national 
and non-national sectors. On the contrary, a new situation evolved recently 
when Honda Motors instituted employment conditions, calling upon employees 
to work 48 hours per week. Proton's management took up the idea and 
demanding that working hours be increased at the new factory in ‘green field’ 
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Proton City! Moreover, Proton also demanded that Proton employees, who 
volunteer to relocate to the new workplace, do this without transfer benefits. 
This move by the management came in a situation where Proton is loosing 
market shares in Malaysia to Honda, Toyota and HMC, and where the sole 
national auto manufacturer faces increased competition in the future within the 
regional free trade area (AFTA). The loyalty of the OEM enterprise unions is 
increasingly stretched. 
Hence, the effectiveness of the autoworker unions seems to be much 
higher in Korea than in Malaysia. The Korean unions pursued a radical and 
militant strategy, which has paid off so far, in spite of -- or because of -- the 
Korean auto industry has been globalizing rapidly. The Korean autoworker 
unions are still in favor of establishing a centralized IR system within the metal 
industry, although factions within the key enterprise unions in the large auto 
manufacturing firms are hesitant to give up autonomy, considering the 
effectiveness of radical and militant enterprise unionism in the past. The 
Malaysian autoworker unions have also secured higher than average wages in 
the protected auto industry, which again is in line with the trend in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector that unionized companies pay better than non-unionized 
companies (Standing 1992; Wad 1997). But with creeping regionalization of the 
Malaysian automobile market, the benefits, achieved through a long process of 
unionization and collective bargaining lead by the industrial union, are now 
under pressure. While the industrial union has adopted a more pragmatic 
ideology, the larger enterprise unions have been under attack from their 
management, and these pressures may turn the big in-house unions away from 
a conservative stance towards a more pragmatic ideology. This is reflected in 
the agreement with the industrial union to form a federation of autoworker 
unions -- for auto policy reasons, anyway, and in contrast to the Korean unions, 
which formed the federation as a means to further centralized organization and 
collective bargaining with the employers. Yet, the federation has been 
established in Korea, not in Malaysia, and this gives the Korean radical 
unionists an edge over the Malaysian pragmatic unionists. However, the unions 
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in the auto chain leading firms (the OEMs) and especially also in the market 
leading firms (Korean HMC, Malaysian Proton) are reluctant to give up their 
autonomy, which have secured them privileged wage and working conditions in 
the past, either through militant struggles (HMC union) or through state-
supported management-union collaboration (Proton union). Finally, the 
advances of the Democratic Labor Party in Korea compared to the newly 
merged center-left party, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), in Malaysia, indicate that 
the radical Korean trade unions have succeeded in the endeavor to generate an 
integrated labor movement, which may further labor-friendly IR institutions in 
Korea and underpin the strength of trade unions at the enterprise- and industry 
levels.  
Hence, with the different position in the global value chain and the 
different political institutions the Korean autoworker unions will probably 
continue to be radical and militant and achieve centralized unionization, yet 
without centralized bargaining due to the forces of globalization, while the 
Malaysian autoworker unions will be more pragmatic and stay pluralistic at the 
industry level, yet cooperating more in order to influence state auto policy and 
coordinate collective bargaining at the enterprise level.  
CONCLUSION 
Is the dynamic of autoworker unionism in Korea and Malaysia conditioned by, 
and eventually also influencing the globalization processes in the local auto 
industry and in the wider political economy of the countries? The answer is a 
contextualized "yes", and the argument is as follows: 
 The financial crisis in 1997 was the dramatic peak of financial 
globalization in East Asia in the 1990s, and it did accelerate the existing trend in 
Korea towards centralized unionism in the auto industry, while it suspended the 
trend in the Malaysian auto industry towards decentralized unionism. 
 Although the Korean and Malaysian unions were affected by the financial 
crisis from different structural and strategic positions, and were exposed to 
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different national policies and corporate strategies of crisis management, the 
Korean unions and Malaysian unions generally followed, respectively, a more 
radical and militant and a more pragmatic and moderate strategy. This 
difference in union ideology evolved over time, and it is explained by the harsh 
suppression of workers in the authoritarian, repressive developmental state in 
Korea, while the Malaysian  -- and especially the new Malay -- workers were 
partly subordinated a hegemonic indigenization policy, which the Malaysian 
state pursued in the economy in general and in the auto industry in particular. 
The early radicalism of the Malaysian autoworker union is to be understood in 
the historic specific conjuncture of neo-imperialism in Southeast Asia and 
ethno-political tensions in Malaysia. 
In the global-local perspective we face two paradoxes. The first paradox 
is that in spite of the difference in union ideology, the outcome in terms of IR 
institutions was rather similar in the sense that the auto industry contained a 
mixture of industrial and enterprise unions and formal or informal federations of 
these unions, and that collective bargaining was by and large undertaken 
bilaterally at the enterprise level. This situation was generated by a dynamic, 
which took the Malaysian system down from a centralized IR system within the 
low technology assembly industry (the globally subordinated local OEMs) to a 
rather decentralized IR system within the SOE-MNC controlled industry, while 
the Korean system became more centralized through the confrontations 
between militant enterprise unions and authoritarian employers and authorities 
within an auto industry, which over time become much more indigenized, 
technologically advanced, export-oriented and diversified into multiple auto 
manufacturers and an under-wood of component suppliers. Yet, in both auto 
industries the large enterprise unions resisted organizational centralization, 
which could impede their autonomy, and due to the strength of unions of the 
market leading firms a breakthrough did happen in neither Korea nor Malaysia, 
although the Koreans was a step ahead of the Malaysians having established a 
federation of metalworkers unions, including the important auto workers unions.  
The second paradox is that the radicalism of the Korean autoworker 
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unions was maintained during the 1990s globalization of the auto industry, while 
radicalism was abandoned by the Malaysian autoworker unions in favor of 
union pragmatism, when the indigenization of the Malaysian auto industry 
unfolded since the early 1980s and a local auto supplier industry had been 
formed. Both Korean and Malaysian union ideologies, strategies, organizational 
structures and forms of collective bargaining made sense and changed with the 
circumstances. The union effectiveness was above average in both countries in 
comparison to other industries, but the Korean autoworkers rapidly achieved a 
much higher level of wages and working conditions than their Malaysian 
counterpart. 
This cross-country difference is partly explained by the different position 
held by the Korean and Malaysian auto companies in the global and local auto 
value chain. The radicalism and effectiveness of Korean autoworker unions 
sustained the development of dynamic efficiency among Korean auto 
manufacturing firms, which again sustained and improved export 
competitiveness and later on outward FDI. In the same way, the intra-industry 
differences in wages and working conditions among auto manufacturing firms 
and components supplier firms were also related to the stratification of the 
domestic auto value chain, and this uneven distribution of benefits created 
obstacles of centralized unionization and collective bargaining. The centralized 
IR system in Malaysia evolved in an auto industry composed primarily of firms 
assembling imported CKD kits of components. The inequality of employment 
conditions between auto manufacturers and component suppliers was a driver 
of the strategy to centralized unionism and collective bargaining in Korea, while 
the inequality was not perceived as that significant by the Malaysian industrial 
union, probably because it has been dealing with these problems since the 
early 1990s.  
Finally, the Korean autoworker unions became part of a new, 
independent and democratic labor movement in the "Great Labor Struggle" in 
the late 1980s, and they have stayed with this labor movement, which also spun 
off a democratic labor party. The Malaysian autoworker unions arose in a labor 
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market, which already carried centralized IR institutions, established in late 
colonialism to counteract the eventual return of a defeated Communist labor 
movement, and which was transformed in accordance with a new ethno-political 
policy of indigenization. The radical industrial union tried to create an 
alternative, radical trade union movement, but failed and became the internal 
opposition after returning to the labor center (MTUC)9. The Malaysian unions 
stayed united in a pragmatic-conservative trade union center, while the Korean 
unions have been divided into a radical labor center (KCTU) and a 
conservative-turned-pragmatic trade union center (FKTU). But in spite of this 
difference in trade union unity, the Korean unions held more political leverage 
due to their militancy and larger political space in comparison with Malaysian 
unions which risk immediate deregistration if they adopt an illegal, militant 
strategy or engage in political struggles like the Koreans. 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1 This paper is a product of my collaboration with Jooyeon Jeong, Korea University and 
enduring interviews and discussions with trade unionists in the Korea and Malaysia. The recent 
research from 2001 to 2003 on trade unions in Korea and Malaysia was supported financially by 
the Danish Research Council for Social Sciences (SSF). Moreover, research on automobile 
global value chains and foreign-local linkages in Malaysia, India and South Africa 2003-2004 
has been supported by the Danish Council for Development Research (RUF) in relation to the 
research project ‘Globalization, Competitiveness and Third World Enterprises’ 2001-2004.   
2 Gereffi (1999, p. 38 note 1) uses the term to signify “relational contracting, specification 
contracting, and full-package supply”, i.e. both end-user commodities and intermediary 
commodities, as long as they are produced by using brand owner specifications and standards. 
Within the auto industry ‘community’ the term OEM denotes the assemblers regardless of their 
‘brand’ or ‘design’ status, and we will stick to this simple terminology to avoid confusion, except 
in table 1 in the appendix (see explanatory note).   
3 Proton exported 8,648 units in 2002 and 7,929 units in 2003 (Proton Annual Report 2003, p. 
34). 
4 Koo (2001) uses slightly different English names for these unions. 
5 Interview with HMC union officers by Jeong & Wad, June 2001. 
6 The industrial union was originally named the Transport Equipment and Allied Industries 
Employees Union (TEAIEU) and shifted name in early 1990s to differentiate itself from the 
Transport Workers Union unionizing drivers etc. 
7 IMF News 2003, No.3 
8 The New York Times 2003-08-19. 
9 In the tri-annual MTUC election by the end of 2004, the executive secretary of the NUTEAIW        
won the presidency of the MTUC due to an election alliance between two pragmatic coalitions 
of unions against the conservative coalition presided by the former MTUC president. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Evolution of the Korean and Malaysian auto industries, state 
policies and the Autoworker unions  
Korea Malaysia Period 
Industry structure & 
GO's auto and labor 
policies 
Autoworker 
unions 
Industry structure & 
GO's auto and labor 
policies 
Autoworker 
unions 
1950s Import of CBUs; state 
corporatism & anti-
communism (until 
today) 
- Import of CBUs; 
sector-wise IR 
corporatism & anti-
communism (until fall 
of USSR) 
- 
1960s Home market OEM; IS 
policy for CBUs; state 
corporatism 
Unorganized Home market OEM; IS 
policy for CBUs; 
legalistic labor policy. 
Unorganized 
1970s Home market ODM; 
IS policy for CBU & 
components; 
repressive state 
corporatism 
Company-union 
at HMC 
Home market OEM; IS 
policy for CBUs; 
ethno-labor policy & 
weak sector 
corporatism 
Radical 
industrial union 
& centralized 
CB  
1980s Home/export OBM; IS 
& EO policy; 
repressive micro 
corporatism and then 
retreat of the state 
during "Great Labor 
Struggle" 
KIA with 
cooperative 
management-
union relations. 
Radical enterprise 
unions & plant CB 
DMC from 1985 
and HMC from 
1987 etc. 
Home OEM & 
OEM(B); IS policy for 
CBU & components 
with national car 
project & localization; 
ethno-micro 
corporatism (in-house 
unionism) 
Radical 
industrial union 
& weak 
centralized CB; 
Conservative 
enterprise union 
& enterprise CB 
1990s Home/export & FDI by  
OBMs; IS & EO policy; 
legalistic & repressive 
labor policy with liberal 
reform before financial 
crisis and social 
corporatism during the 
crisis 
Radical enterprise 
unions & 
enterprise/group 
CB; 
Federations at 
group, industry & 
national levels 
Home/weak export & 
FDI ODM(B); 
expanded national 
motor vehicle program 
& localization; (ethno) 
micro corporatism and 
rudimentary state 
corporatism during 
financial crisis 
Pragmatic 
industrial union 
into OES & 
enterprise CB; 
Conservative 
enterprise 
unions & 
enterprise CB 
2000s Export & FDI by 
OBMs; free trade and 
FDI regime; legalistic 
labor policy. 
Radical enterprise 
unions & 
enterprise/group 
CB; 
Federations at 
group, industry & 
national levels; 
Industrial union 
with OES 
Home/weak export & 
FDI by OBM; regional 
free trade area (AFTA) 
policy; (ethno) micro 
corporatism 
Pragmatic 
industrial union 
& enterprise CB;
Conservative 
enterprise 
unions & 
enterprise CB; 
Federation 
agreed by 
industrial & key 
enterprise 
unions in OBM 
& OEM. 
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Notes:  
- CBU: completely build up automobile. OEM: original equipment manufacturer. ODM: Original 
design manufacturer. OBM: original brand manufacturer. OEM(B): OEM with own marketing 
brand. OBM(B): OBM with own marketing brand. 
- Home market, export market & FDI mean that the manufacturer is oriented towards the home 
market, the export market and undertakes foreign direct investment. 
- OES: Original equipment supplier of auto components. 
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